Indepth News Story on Galwan Incident

 

THE GALWAN KILLINS: NAIL IN THE COFFIN FOR INDO-CHINA RELATIONSHIP

 

The recent killings in the Galwan Valley have dealt a significant blow to the already strained relationship between China and India, leaving India extremely angry and dissatisfied. Over the past two months, the two countries have been locked in a series of confrontations along their disputed Himalayan border, creating the most severe crisis in their relations in more than five decades. While occasional border transgressions have occurred in the past, this current standoff is distinct and carries greater consequences, as it threatens to undermine the fragile framework that has prevented open hostility between China and India.

Right from the beginning, it was evident that this border crisis would be different. Reports emerged in early May of physical altercations between Chinese and Indian border patrols, and Indian media made a startling revelation. China had deployed thousands of soldiers and artillery to multiple locations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de facto border, in the Ladakh region where it meets Tibet. There were even instances of temporary crossing of the LAC near the Galwan River.

Adding to the concern was China's incursion into areas of the LAC that were considered settled by India, including Sikkim and the Galwan River. Of particular worry was China's attempt to establish control over a disputed Gray zone along the banks of Pangong Lake, an area where the exact location of the LAC has long been a point of contention.

The reasons behind China's border manoeuvres have sparked intense speculation in India. Some suggested that China was reacting to India's decision in August 2019 to revoke Kashmir's autonomous status, while others pointed to new Indian restrictions on Chinese investments or China's desire to project strength internationally amid the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the most likely explanation is that China was responding to India's recent infrastructure upgrades near the LAC, aiming to establish a fait accompli. Regardless of the motive, China's tactics this time appeared more aggressive than before.

In conclusion, the Galwan Valley incident has severely impacted the China-India relationship, leaving India furious and exacerbating the existing unease. This crisis stands out as a significant event in their history, posing a threat to the fragile equilibrium that has prevented open rivalry between the two countries.

But if Beijing was drawing from a familiar playbook, its tactics this time appeared far more aggressive.

 

After several rounds of inconclusive talks between lower-ranking officers, senior commanders from China and India met on June 6 and reached an agreement to de-escalate tensions along the border. However, just one week later, a tragic incident occurred near the Galwan River, resulting in a violent clash. The rules of engagement prohibit the use of live ammunition but do not prevent hand-to-hand combat. During the fight on the narrow ridgeline of a Himalayan mountain, 20 Indian soldiers were killed, some of them beaten to death with makeshift weapons. China has not disclosed its own casualties to avoid further antagonism.

The exact details and location of the brawl are still a subject of debate. According to reports, the violence erupted when Indian forces approached the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to verify China's compliance with the disengagement agreement. The confrontation began when the Indian patrol demanded the removal of a Chinese outpost that extended onto the Indian side of the LAC.

In the aftermath of the incident, both Beijing and Delhi accused each other of violating the LAC and initiating hostilities. Surprisingly, China asserted its claim over the entire Galwan River valley, a departure from the previous understanding of its territorial claims. India's External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, stated that China's actions aimed to alter the ground reality in violation of their agreements.

Despite the blame game, both sides expressed a desire to de-escalate the situation. Neither country has shown interest in a broader conflict, and a subsequent 11-hour meeting between senior military commanders focused on steps for de-escalation. Currently, the Galwan River area along the LAC has returned to relative calm.

However, there are complications. Recent reports, supported by satellite imagery, suggest that instead of disengaging, China has reinforced its position in the Galwan area. Chinese defensive structures, shelters, trenches, and vehicles are now visible, and there are indications of construction near the Galwan River that may affect its flow. Similar developments have been observed in other parts of the eastern sector, such as the Depsang Valley.

Furthermore, even if both sides adhere to the de-escalation roadmap agreed upon on June 6, which covers multiple sites including Galwan River, Depsang, Gogra, and Hot Springs, there remains a more challenging standoff at Pangong Lake. Over the years, this area has witnessed numerous hostile encounters between Chinese and Indian forces. With no mutually agreed-upon LAC, a stretch between "Finger 4" and "Finger 8" on the lake's northern bank has become a contentious Gray zone, patrolled by both sides. China has a strategic advantage in the region due to a road it constructed in 1999, while Indian soldiers must navigate difficult terrain on foot to patrol the disputed area.

Recently, several hundred Chinese troops advanced westward from Finger 8 towards India's easternmost base at Finger 4, establishing a camp and erecting structures along the way. This move has raised concerns about China's occupation of Indian territory, prompting debates in the Indian media regarding possible responses from Delhi.

India Is Paying the Price for Neglecting its Neighbours

When Narendra Modi assumed power, he pledged to prioritize relationships with neighbouring countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. However, China has capitalized on his failure to deliver on those promises. It comes as no surprise that the Indian public is furious. A significant and growing segment of the Indian elite had already become increasingly disillusioned with China in recent years due to Beijing's support for Pakistan, border provocations, and expanding influence in India's immediate region. As a result, there has been a mounting desire for a stronger partnership with the United States, amplified by a broader section of Indian society. This includes those who were once hopeful for a constructive relationship with China or a more balanced approach between Washington and Beijing. The researcher Sushant Sareen highlights that the strategy of maintaining a delicate balance between the US and China has become ineffective, and India now faces a decision between reinforcing a failed policy or forging a closer alliance with the US and its allies.

The Trump administration has largely refrained from making extensive public comments on the crisis. While Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alice Wells warned of China's consistent aggression and attempts to reshape the status quo, the US government's relatively reserved stance is more likely a reflection of the Indian government's preference. India has privately advised Washington against taking a more public role in its disputes with China.

Over the past few decades, both China and India have invested significant efforts in managing their conflicting interests and addressing the challenges posed by their disputed border, which stretches over 2,100 miles.

Maintaining a delicate balance and avoiding crossing each other's boundaries has been crucial for both China and India, as they compete and engage in various conflicts while outwardly maintaining a sense of harmony. However, China's past actions, such as denying a visa to an Indian military officer from Kashmir in 2010, surfacing submarines in Sri Lanka in 2014, and attempting to extend a road into the disputed Doklam plateau in 2017, have disrupted this balance and elicited strong reactions from India. The recent border incident with China has not only upset the balance but completely altered the dynamics. China's actions have inadvertently pushed India closer to forming stronger alliances with Western countries, contrary to China's intentions.

Some analysts argue that China believes India's historical nonalignment stance will prevent it from getting too close to the United States. However, others, including China expert Yun Sun, hold the opposite view. They believe that Beijing sees India as a lost cause and no amount of accommodating Indian sensitivities will stop India from aligning with its natural partner, the United States. According to this perspective, China considers India strategically unreliable and is not willing to make territorial concessions to gain India's support. Instead, China aims to pursue tactical gains since a strategic friendship with India seems unviable. With China having established its own infrastructure network along the border, Beijing may want to halt the infrastructure competition and perceives India's road-building efforts as a betrayal while it deals with growing tensions with the United States and international criticism related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

 

Regardless of China's calculations, it should expect a more confrontational stance from the Indian government in the coming years.

Shortly after the conflict, reports emerged in the Indian media stating that India intends to prohibit Chinese companies from supplying telecom equipment to state-run telecommunication companies and may extend the ban to private mobile operators using equipment from companies like Huawei and ZTE. There were also indications that India is considering inviting Australia to participate in the Malabar naval exercise, joining Japan and the United States. Additionally, Chinese imports were reported to be facing delays at key Indian ports since June 22. An article in India's largest Hindi-language newspaper called on the Modi government to reassess its policies regarding Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong and be prepared to exit organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. India is likely to review its approach to various aspects of its relationship with China, including the Quad, the Belt and Road Initiative, the South China Sea issue, and the Dalai Lama.

In the short term, India aims to restore the pre-May status quo along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), including at Pangong Lake. However, if Beijing resists this, Delhi's immediate options for response are limited and undesirable. Despite calls within India for military retaliation and escalation, the global recession and the ongoing pandemic make Delhi hesitant to initiate a war over a relatively small area of land that was not under its sovereignty before.

Looking ahead, the stakes extend beyond the specific region of Pangong Lake, and there are more effective but longer-term measures to impose costs on China for its border actions. India already possesses the world's third-largest military budget and is expected to become the world's most populous country with the fourth-largest economy within a decade. China is aware of India's potential, which is why, despite its disdain for India, Beijing has sought to avoid a significant rupture in its relationship with Delhi. However, the current Chinese approach, characterized by assertive "Wolf Warrior" diplomats, indicates a departure from previous cautious diplomacy. China may have forgotten the consequences of winning battles but losing the broader war.

JAI HIND (Long Live India)